ment of British economics has been discussed by Professor A. W. Coats in a recent article of that title, in the Journal of Law and Economics. Coats lists among the reasons for the stagnant condition of British economics in 1871
'a restrictive academic power structure'.3 There is undoubtedly some truth in this suggestion, especially as applied to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, where religious tests excluded from Professorial posts all but members of the Established Church.4 But just how far a restrictive academic power structure was present as a factor capable of stultifying the development of the science has not been defined. An examination of Jevons' charges requires data which throw some light on this issue. However, the first purpose of this note is to offer a partial test of Jevons' second allegation, through an enquiry into the behavior of Mill and his followers in relation to elections to chairs in political economy in England, Ireland and Scotland during the period 1848 to 1873.5 It will be argued that while Jevons' first allegation is undeniable, his second will not bear close inspection.
What is to be tested is whether Mill and his immediate disciples deliberately and concertedly sought the appointment of a candidate of their own persuasion in elections which were contested also by a candidate or candidates known to hold uncongenial views in matters of economic analysis. We shall confine ourselves to instances where Millian intervention is known to have occurred. It might have been asked simply, How often were the Millians involved? A glance at Table 1, which shows the elections which took place to chairs in political economy during our period, the method used to select the successful candidate, and whether any member of Mill's circle is known to have tried to influence the outcome, suggests not very often.6 This is prima Jacie evidence in the Millians' favour. However, we cannot be sure that the surviving records show the full extent of their involvement. Thus having failed to gain first place in the political economy examination in 1860. Letter Table 1 is not conclusive proof that they played no part in a particular contest; it may only reflect gaps in the official documents or the private papers of Mill and his closest disciples. Moreover, the wording of Jevons' allegation is such as to imply that the Millians intervened only where they thought they had a reasonable chance of determining the outcome. Non-involvement in some cases might therefore be quite consistent with Jevons' charge. On the other hand, it would strongly suggest that the Millians were innocent if it were found that, even where intervention was open to them and there was a possibility that a critic would be elected if they stood aside, they nevertheless did not automatically unite behind a candidate whom they could trust to be a spokesman for their views. As to the role of the Millians, the evidence of the five cases considered above is less equivocal. There was no monolithic 'Mill faction'; factional activity, even where it can be demonstrated (as at Cambridge in 1863), did not operate in the way required to substantiate Jevons' allegation; and neither Mill nor his disciples sought to influence appointments in a manner which suggests that they placed a man's orthodoxy above every other quality. 
